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Abstract: Endogenous sunk-cost investments are optional fixed investment or capita, that a firm can 
choose to impact either upon its price-cost margin or its market share for capturing larger market 
spoils. Oft-cited examples are investments in vertical product (quality) differentiation, advertising 
outlays, and R&D type expenses for improving production processes. The importance of sunk-cost 
capital has been highlighted in the recent literature since these investments significantly influence 
the degree of competition in an industry mainly through forestalling entry and thereby limiting 
future competition in the industry. Sunk-cost investments play an important role in the debate on 
the competition-(in)stability perspectives for the banking industry. This paper is motivated by an 
important distinction, hitherto unrecognized, that some endogenous sunk-cost investments impact 
on the relative efficiencies of firms and thereby on its market spoils or profits, while others will only 
impact on its market share and thereby on profits. An example of this distinction is as follows: while 
quality improvement in a product or production processes will create efficiencies and, therefore, 
additional profits, while advertising expenses are used to snatch market shares from rivals. The 
unintended consequence of the first type of endogenous-sunk cost investment is to boost efficiencies 
and thereby shape the nature of competition in a market. The second type will have little effect on 
efficiencies. In this paper, by exploiting the above distinction and using a dataset created from the 
annual reports of nine major Islamic banks in Jordon during 1993–2010, we will apply the efficiency 
models and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) methodology to test if information 
technology (IT) capital is strategically used by Islamic banks as an endogenous sunk-cost investment 
to boost their relative efficiencies. For the first time—to the best of our knowledge—we find that IT 
capital is strategically used by seven out of the nine Islamic banks. We then consider the implication 
of the strategic use of IT capital by Islamic banks for the nature of competition in the Islamic bank 
industry of Jordon. By so doing, we also argue that IT capital, through its effects on the nature of 
competition, will lend stability to the Islamic banking industry of Jordan. 
Keywords: endogenous sunk-cost investment; information and technology investment; islamic 
banking industry; degree of competition 
JEL Classification: G21; L13; L59. 
 
1. Introduction 
In a branch of modern industrial economics, commonly known as the endogenous sunk-cost 
investment (see Sutton 1991, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Shaked and Sutton 1983; Shaked 
and Sutton 1987), economists seek to understand and explain a peculiar type of empirical regularities 
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that fail to disappear even after five decades from modern (industrial) markets. In this context, what 
is commonly known as “market structure” issues can be summarized by twin (long-term) 
observations. First, many industries worldwide have a few dominant firms with large market shares; 
second, the size distribution of firms within most industries are highly lopsided or skewed and 
remains almost invariant over time. These twin observations arise despite the fact that individual 
industries have wide variations in terms of (industry-specific) idiosyncratic features. Sutton (2007) 
argues that most, if not all, industries are propelled by “some highly robust competitive mechanisms” 
to yield the above empirical regularities. The raison d’être of the endogenous sunk-cost investment 
models is to understand the competitive mechanism that can create and propel such regularity across 
various markets. Our main contribution is to apply the endogenous sunk-cost investment theory to 
a very novel market, which is called the Islamic banking industry, for understanding if the Islamic 
banking industry has also been subject to the above competitive mechanism and what are the 
implications of the above competitive mechanism for the Islamic banking industry. 
Endogenous sunk-cost investment, as an important ingredient of modern industries, mainly 
includes scientific and engineering personnel, high-tech laboratories, information technology (IT) 
and related inputs to improve upon (i) product quality and (ii) the technology of production. The 
only other category of endogenous sunk-cost investment, such as advertisement expenses, is that 
firms grab larger market shares without any effect on efficiency (see Dick 2007). In a pioneering paper, 
building on Sutton (2007), Dick (2007) shows that endogenous sunk-cost investments are a major 
driver of competition and rivalry in the modern banking industry while the links between 
competition and stability for banking have been seriously explored in the existing literature (Ariss 
2010; Jeon et al. 2011; Fu et al. 2014; Diallo 2015; Jtsma et al. 2017, etc.—see Section 2 for details). 
In this paper, we examine the impacts of endogenous sunk-cost investment for Islamic banks, 
for the first time—to the best of our knowledge—by applying a historical data set from Jordon1. If 
endogenous sunk-cost investment plays an important role for boosting efficiencies, then such 
investments can have far-reaching consequences for the nature of competition in the Islamic banking 
industry to shape the long-term stability of this industry. On the contrary, if we find that endogenous 
sunk-cost investments have a minimal or no role for the Islamic banking industry, then one can argue 
that the Islamic banking market can be beset with stability issues. From the existing literature, we 
know that the presence of endogenous sunk-cost investments in the traditional banking sector leads 
to the following features in the traditional banking industry (see Dick 2007): first and foremost, the 
nature of bank competition across (banking) markets becomes almost homologous in the presence of 
significant endogenous sunk-cost investment. Second, regardless of the size of the banking industry, 
the concentration index in the banking industry remains unchanged over time. Thirdly, the position 
 
1 At the outset, the selection of the country and its industry begs the question of whether it is justified to 
consider Jordon’s Islamic banking industry for a detailed analysis like this. In the Middle East, Jordon’s 
banking industry has consistently posted an excellent record since the early 1990s, as policy makers launched 
a series of banking liberalization measures to fight financial repression in Jordan. Such measures were meant 
to intensify competition among banks for delivering efficiency gains. As a result, the banking sector became 
one of the largest economic sectors in Jordon; by 2019, the banking industry contributed 18.8% of Jordon’s 
GDP. As another indicator of its relevance, in 2017, the total assets of Jordon’s banks stood at 114% of its 
GDP, while the global average stood at 64%. Despite mounting economic challenges in the region, Jordon’s 
banks have maintained excellent profit figures with adequate stocks of liquid assets and healthy capital 
adequacy ratios (17.2% in 2019). The banking sector has enforced a strong compliance system to contain the 
NPL ratio under 6%. Hence, Jordon fulfils all Basel III requirements. Jordon thus stands out as a prime 
example of how competition can promote efficiency in banking without risking financial instability. 
Additionally, in Section 2, we will also highlight that the Islamic banks have become a major player in Jordon. 
There are two important sources of growth in Islamic banking in Jordon. First, investors came to hold a 
shared perception that Islamic banks adopt more responsible business practices (see Alam and Sheifzadeh 
2020). Second, it is widely held that Islamic banks’ better financing quality lowers their credit risks (see 
Misman and Bhatti 2020). We hence choose Jordon as a prime example of successful banking reforms, with 
the strong presence of Islamic banks, for understanding if endogenous sunk-cost investments can propel 
efficiencies, which will, in turn, create stability for Islamic banking. 
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of dominant banks remains highly stable and mostly unchallenged, while the fringe banks face 
intense competition with increases in the market size. Finally, the quality of baking services increases 
as the market size expands. As the market size grows, dominant banks are found to increase service 
quality by investing in endogenous sunk-cost investment to capture the additional demand when 
market size expands. Thus, endogenous sunk-cost investment is used as barriers to entry by 
dominant banks to lend banking stability. 
In order to assess if the Islamic banking industry is characterized by endogenous sunk-cost 
investment, our analysis will proceed in the following steps with a rough plan of the paper as follows: 
In Section 2, we provide a brief literature review and then explain the methodology to detect 
endogenous sunk-cost investment for the Islamic banking industry. In Section 2, we also explain the 
relevant variables and he historical dataset from Jordan. In Section 3, we apply the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) approach to explain if IT capital operates as an endogenous sunk-cost 
investment in the Islamic banking industry of Jordan. In Section 4, we discuss our findings, and we 
present our conclusions in Section 5. 
2. Modelling Endogenous Sunk-Cost Investment for the Islamic Banking Industry 
The key to the understanding of any segment of a banking industry, like Islamic banking, as a 
single field of study comes from the very nature of banking (see Turner 2014): first and foremost, all 
banks—regardless of their types—operate in financial markets, which makes bank loans an imperfect 
substitute for capital market financing. More importantly, all types of bank financing derive from 
financial intermediation. Second, any model of financial intermediation requires the business of 
banking to exist because the market participants (depositors and borrowers) cannot meet in the 
market place and, hence, require a mediator (bank) to act on their behalf. Third, every transaction is 
internalized within a bank to lessen the adverse impacts of information asymmetries by matching 
borrowers with depositors. Banks receive a compensation for the risk that banks bear for carrying 
out financial intermediation (see Freixas and Rochet 2008). In the banking industry, regardless of the 
specific type of banks, financial intermediation has led to the emergence of two distinct and mutually 
opposing strands of thought, especially since the publication of two path-breaking monographs in 
the 1960s: the work of Gerschenkron (1962) stressed the role of banking in driving industrial and 
economic growth by improving efficiency as a result of better matching between borrowers and 
lenders by banks. On the other hand, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that the banking sector 
makes the entire economic system extremely fragile as panics—fueled by bank failures (due to the 
problem of information asymmetries)—can create and amplify economic downturns across 
numerous sectors of an economy. 
Can Islamic banks promote banking efficiency without triggering banking instability/fragility? 
Basov and Bhatti (2016), pp. 85–101, argued that Islamic banks play a special role to partially 
overcome the problems of information asymmetries: by applying the model of monopolistic 
screening, Basov and Bhatti argued that Islamic banks have a greater incentive to devise an optimal 
compensation scheme for the managers of firms/borrowers to mitigate the adverse consequences of 
information asymmetries. Misman and Bhatti (2020) found that Islamic banks lower their credit risks by 
improving their financing quality. They further noted that the size and the age of an Islamic bank are 
important determinants of its credit risk. Thus, the question of efficiency vis-a-vis fragility is fast becoming 
a central theme of the Islamic banking industry. In order to evaluate this important theme, we provide a 
detailed review of the existing literature on efficiency and fragility lest our emphasis be misplaced. 
It is only recently that endogenous sunk-cost investments have been brought to the forefront to 
understand how efficiency and stability evolve in the banking sector characterized by the presence 
of large endogenous sunk-cost investments. To fully comprehend the ramifications of the 
endogenous sunk-cost investments for the Islamic banking industry, it is imperative to examine the 
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consequences of the endogenous sunk-cost investment to the issues of efficiency and fragility in the 
existing banking literature2 
Endogenous sunk-cost investments drive efficiencies by either creating new products or 
improving the production processes, which converts technological possibilities into economic 
opportunities. A firm’s endogenous sunk-cost investments can directly impact on its profitability by 
raising the price-cost margin. Hence, ceteris paribus, the endogenous sunk-cost investment will either 
(a) enhance the value of a firm’s product to its customers due to improved product quality or (b) 
lower its marginal and average costs of production due to technological, or process, innovations3. 
Endogenous sunk-cost investments, due to their effects on efficiency, are expected to intensify 
competition among firms operating in a market. Such investments are also known to limit potential 
competition by limiting future entry (see Sutton 2007 and others). The existing (banking) literature has 
done little to highlight the endogenous sunk-cost investment; however, a large amount of literature 
exists on the impacts of efficiencies and competition on the stability of banking. 
How does increased efficiency or competition impact the stability of the banking sector? The 
findings have been rather inconclusive. In recent years, there are important studies to address this 
question, which can be broadly divided into the cross-country studies and the country studies. In a 
pioneering paper, Ariss (2010) uses the Lerner’s index of market power for assessing the impact of 
increased competition on the profit, cost efficiencies and the overall market stability of the banking 
sectors of several emerging economies of our globe. Ariss finds that an increase in market power 
increases the bank stability and profit efficiency, however, lowers cost efficiencies. Hence, more 
competition can be detrimental for stability in the banking industry. Diallo (2015), exploring the 
banking industries of 145 countries during 1997–2007, highlights how increases in bank competition 
can create banking fragility and precipitate financial crises. Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) focus upon 
one segment of the entire banking sector in Europe—namely, the cooperative banks—to argue that a 
rising competition can improve the financial stability of this specific market segment. Forssbaeck and 
Shehzad (2015) extend the study in a large panel of banks from many countries to show that increased 
competition can incentivize bankers to adopt more risky business strategies and will, hence, increase 
banking instability. Fu et al. (2014) turn their attention to the regional banking industries of 14 Asia-
Pacific nations during 2003–2007 to establish that the effects of banking competition on the systemic 
stability of the regional markets are rather mixed. Fungáčová and Weill (2013), examining the Russian 
banking industry from 2001 to 2007, argue that a tighter bank control increases the probability of a 
bank failure. Almarzoqi et al. (2015), in their study of the banks in the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries, examine the impacts of the Lerner’s index of market power on the Z-scores and 
the liquidity ratios to argue that price competition positively impacts on bank liquidity, as it induces 
self-discipline on banks for the choice of bank funding sources and for the holding of liquid assets. 
However, increased price competition has a negative impact on bank solvency and on the credit 
quality of the loan portfolio. In a European Union (EU)-wide study, Jtsma et al. (2017) utilize the 
experience of 25 EU countries from 1998 to 2014 to argue that the increasing market concentration 
improves banking stability. Kouki and Al-Nasser (2017), examining banks of 31 African countries 
over 2005–2010, note that an increase in competition decreases stability. Lapteacru (2014) examines 
the relevance of competition for banking stability for 10 East European countries during 2000–2010 
to find that the results are mixed. Leroy and Lucotte (2017) examine 97 listed banks in the European 
markets from 2004 to 2013 and note that competition compromises banking stability. Tabak et al. 
(2012), in examining banks of 10 Latin American countries during 2003–2008, find mixed results. 
Tabak et al. (2013) expand the dataset for 17 Latin American countries for the same period and note 
that an increase in competition will increase banking stability. 
 
2 It is also important to highlight that Islamic banks also undertake an important function of dispute resolution 
(besides the Sharia-approved banking activities), as highlighted by Bhatti (2020a). 
3 The other type of sunk-cost investment is comprised of a firm’s expenses to grab market shares from its 
rivals, like advertisement, without any impact on its relative efficiency. 
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As the cross-country studies failed to provide unequivocal conclusion, many authors started 
examining the banking industry at the country level to assess the impacts of banking competition on 
stability. Kick and Prieto (2015), using German universal bank data during 1994–2010, note 
inconclusive results. German universal banks are a special type of banks that are “full-service 
financial firms” offering commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, and other financial 
services. Jimenez et al. 2013), in their study of Spanish banks from 1988 to 2003, find inconclusive 
evidence of whether competition can impact on the stability of the banking industry. In another 
country-level study, Jeon and Lim (2013) examine the impacts of competition on banking stability in 
South Korea during 1999–2011. Their main innovation is to separate the banking industry into 
commercial banks and mutual savings banks to find inconclusive evidence on the precise impact of 
competition on stability for either market segments. Kasman and Kasman (2015) set the analysis in 
the context of Turkey during 2002–2012 to note that an increased competition will compromise 
banking stability in Turkey. Soedarmono et al. (2013), in the context of 11 Asian banks during 1994–
2009, highlight that competition decreases stability. Tabak et al. (2015), in the context of Brazilian 
banks during 2001–2011, note mixed results. 
In this work, we hence rely on the important insights of industrial economics to understand the 
implications of competition and stability by highlighting the impacts of endogenous sunk-cost 
investment on efficiency. 
2.1. Endogenous Sunk-Cost Investment and Imperfect Appropriability 
One of the important issues of endogenous sunk-cost investment is what is known as imperfect 
appropriability,4 which means that a bank might fail to get the full benefits (extra profits) from the 
endogenous sunk-cost investment due possibly to similar investments (or copy-cat strategies) 
adopted by its competitors. As an example, if all banks improve their product quality, there will be 
very little improvement in their individual profits since customers will not vote with their feet.5 It is 
imperative to note that there are several ways in which firms appropriate gains from endogenous 
sunk-cost investment, though the effectiveness of these appropriability mechanisms vastly differ 
across industries and innovations (see Levin et al. 1987; Cohen and Klepper 1996; Cohen et al. 2000). 
The strength of the appropriability regime is a critical factor for creating dominant firms with 
large market shares and persistence of size distribution in an industry. This strength of the 
appropriability regime also determines potential competition by forestalling entry. In Section 2.2, we 
utilize the relative performance of banks to detect the effectiveness of endogenous sunk-cost 
investment in appropriating the value added from IT capital. 
2.2. Detection of the Sunk-Cost Investment 
The central mechanism of sunk-cost investment is that a bank can optimally choose to invest in 
endogenous sunk-cost investment, which will increase the price-cost margin to enable the bank to 
appropriate the value added. Thus, profitability will rise with an increase in sunk-cost capital, given 
the market share of a bank. As the market size and/or a firm’s output increases, their incentive to 
invest in endogenous sunk-cost investment will increase, ceteris paribus. 
In a similar vein, the sunk-cost investment fails to be effective for a bank if all banks invest 
equally in acquiring endogenous sunk-cost investment, which will give rise to the appropriability 
 
4 At the textbook level, appropriability is defined by Kay (1995) as the capacity of a business entity to capture 
the value added—through its rivalry with its competitors in the market—that it creates for its own profits. 
The value added is created and captured either by innovating better products or better processes than their 
rivals. The appropriability critically depends on the structure of the market in which it operates (see Cohen 
et al. 2000). 
5 There will be little effects on their profits if a bank improves its product quality or technology of production, 
which is easily imitable or reproducible by others. The appropriability regime is defined as weak. On the 
other hand, some quality improvements involve sticky knowledge, which are intimately ingrained in a 
particular organization, so that they cannot be easily imitated and replanted elsewhere in a meaningful way. 
The market/system has strong appropriability (see Teece 2000). 
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problem. In other words, the ex-ante (subjective) profitability will fail to be ex-post (realized) 
profitability if a firm’s rivals match that firm’s sunk-cost investment. The sunk-cost investment of a 
bank fails to have any impact since it does not produce any perceptible effect on the profitability of a 
bank. The bank-specific profitability, or price-cost margin, is the key to the detection of sunk-cost 
investment for a bank. We hence put forward two hypotheses to empirically test if a firm has 
endogenous sunk-cost investment: 
Hypothesis 1. If the chosen sunk-cost investment of a bank increases its cost efficiency relative to other banks, 
the investment is considered an endogenous sunk-cost investment. This hypothesis is predicated upon the 
definition of an endogenous sunk-cost investment that improves the technology of production used by a bank, 
given the quality of its products or services. If a bank fails to improve its relative (cost) efficiency, which signifies 
the presence of serious appropriability problem for reaping the benefits from sunk-cost investments. 
Hypothesis 2. If the chosen (endogenous) investment of a bank increases its profit efficiency, the investment 
is defined as an endogenous sunk-cost investment. This hypothesis invokes another facet of the endogenous 
sunk-cost investment: it defines an endogenous sunk-cost investment as the outlay to improve its product 
quality, which will increase its profitability given the technology of production. The implicit assumption is that 
the higher the quality of the product of a bank, the higher will be the price given the cost function, by 
construction, which assumes away the appropriability problem. Hence, the larger is the endogenous sunk-cost 
investment by a bank, the larger will be its relative profitability, or profit efficiency, compared to its rival. 
In the following sub-section, we will define the measures of efficiency utilized in this paper for 
the Islamic banks. The main prediction of the existing literature from Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
is given by the following: 
Prediction 1. The major implication of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 is that, for industries with significant 
endogenous sunk-cost investment, the concentration ratio in the industry will be at best sluggish—if not totally 
invariant—over time. In theoretical terms, the concentration of an industry with significant endogenous sunk-
cost investment will have a lower bound to its concentration index. (Sutton 1991, chp. 3) 
The theoretical prediction, confirmed by most empirical studies, is explained by entry barriers 
for potential entrants created by the endogenous sunk-cost investment. The entry barrier is erected 
by the need to incur an additional cost—for any potential entrant—for acquiring an endogenous 
sunk-cost investment necessary to enter and meaningfully participate in the market which can, if 
suitably chosen by incumbent firms, outweigh the additional revenues generated by the growth of 
revenues for entrants. In what follows in Section 2.3, we apply the standard measures of efficiency 
frontiers to derive the cost efficiency scores and profit efficiency scores of banks. In Section 3, we 
explore if IT capital of individual banks impacts on their efficiency scores for assessing if IT capital is 
truly an endogenous sunk-cost investment for the Islamic banks of Jordan. 
2.3. Efficiency Frontiers to Measure Profitability: The Cost Function Approach to Islamic Banks 
The concept of productivity, or efficiency, of a firm can be reduced to a production function: 
  =  (  ) (1)  
In Equation (1), Y represents the output of an Islamic bank, Xm represents a vector of inputs, and 
f(.) is a functional form representing the embedded technology in the production. The duality theory 
establishes the precise relationships between production function vis-a-vis cost function and profit 
function (Coelli et al. 2005). The main idea of efficiency is either to achieve the least cost given the 
output or to maximize the output (for the maximum profit) given the total cost. When data on prices 
for inputs and outputs are available, a firm is operating in a competitive market, and its aims are to 
achieve cost minimization or/and profit maximization, then it is possible for a firm to decide on the 
best mix of inputs or/and outputs meeting such aims. The cost function is the one that can be 
interpreted as being derived from minimizing cost, subject to the constraint of reasonable production 
technology. The concept of productivity efficiency flows directly from the microeconomic theory of 
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the firm, and the production function represents the maximum rate of output that can be produced 
with given inputs and technology. This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
C = F(Pm, Yn) (2) 
where Yn represents a vector of output, Pm (m = 1, 2… M) is a vector of input prices, and F(.) is a 
functional form. In terms of the cost of production, the efficiency approach seeks to find the best 
practice banks who are cost-efficient while the other banks operate inefficiently above the cost frontier 
above the estimated minimum cost. The basic panel-data cost function model of bank i in year t is 
expressed logarithmically as 
ln Cit = β0 + h(yit, wit; β) + vit + ηit  (3) 
where Cit is the total cost incurred by bank   in year  ; wit denotes the vector of input price of farm   
in period   ; yit denotes the vector of output;   is the vector of the parameters to be estimated; 
ℎ(   ,    ,  ) is the cost function that represents the (dual) cost technology; vit is the noise term; and 
ηit ≥ 0 is the inefficiency score of bank i in year t. We thus assume that the bank inefficiency is 
individual-specific and also time-varying by allowing the likelihood of the bank inefficiency to 
change over time, ηit = ηi k(t) where k(t) is a function of time—see Battese and Coelli (1988, 1992). 
Hence, Equation (3) can be written as 
ln Cit = β0 + h(yit, wit; β) + vit + ηi k(t)  (3a) 
We use a generalisation of the Cobb–Douglas functional form is the so-called translog cost 
function is given below (see Christensen et al. 1973), ignoring the time subscript: 
ln (Cit) =β0 + ∑j αj ln(wjt) + ∑k βk ln(Ykt) + ½ ∑j∑i γji ln(wjt) ln(wit) 
+ ½ ∑k∑l δkl ln(Ykt) ln(Ylt) + ∑j∑k ρik ln(wjt) ln(Ykt) +ηit+ vit 
(3b) 
In Equation (3b), wj is the price of input j; Yk is output k; Ci is the total costs of bank I; and β0, αj, 
βk, γji, δkl, and ρik are the parameters to be estimated. Note that ln is the natural logarithmic 
transformation, and ηit is the time-varying inefficiency term for estimation. The translog cost function 
is estimated as a system of equations. The observables of each of the Islamic bank are the total cost of 
each bank, the allocation of total cost across the various inputs (i.e., input expenditure shares), each 
Islamic bank’s output level, and the input prices that the firm faces. In Equation (3b), we hence have 
Cit—the total costs of bank i in year t; 
Yijt—the vector of the outputs of bank i at date t; output (labelled j) are (i) the total loan, (ii) investment, 
and (iii) other earning assets at date t; 
Wijt—the vector of input prices facing bank i; j is input types which are (i) the price of labor, (ii) price 
of physical capital, and (iii) price of financial capital inputs computed as 
Price of labor = wiL = (total personal expenses/total employment) 
Price of physical capital = wiA = (non-interest and non-personal expenses)/(fixed 
assets) 
Price of financial capital = wiF = (total interest costs)/(total deposits) 
(4) 
 measures time-varying inefficiency. 
The best practice frontier, estimated through a cost function, focuses on the input side of bank 
production and may overlook important dimensions of banks’ decision making. Berger and Mester 
(2003) argue that the use of a profit frontier can be more appropriate than that of a cost frontier 
because it accounts for both output and input suboptimal bank decisions. However, in standard 
profit analysis output prices are taken as exogenous, considering profit inefficiency as a sub-optimal 
choice with respect to input–output relative prices. This is not an accurate representation of the 
banking industry because a large share of revenues originates from bilateral contracting in which 
banks have substantial bargaining power. 
itn
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Alternatively, one can adopt the formulation of the profit function, introduced by Humphrey 
and Pulley (1997), in which output prices are flexible while output levels are taken as given. Errors 
in the choice of outputs do not affect the efficiency vector, while errors in setting output prices do. 
The estimated efficiency levels in this case will measure how close a bank is to its maximum profit 
given an input-output quantity mix. The price to be paid for this gain is the assumption that profits 
are maximized, conditional on output levels. 
2.4. Efficiency Frontiers to Measure Profitability: The Profit Function Approach 
The best practice frontier, estimated through a cost function, focuses on the input side of bank 
production and may overlook important dimensions of banks’ decision-making. Berger and Mester 
(1997) argue that the use of a profit frontier can be more appropriate than that of a cost frontier 
because it accounts for both output and input suboptimal bank decisions. However, in standard 
profit analysis, output prices are taken as exogenous, considering profit inefficiency as a sub-optimal 
choice with respect to input-output relative prices. This is not an accurate representation of the 
banking industry because a large share of revenues originates from bilateral contracting in which 
banks have some bargaining power. We, therefore, adopt the formulation of the profit function, 
introduced by Humphrey and Pulley (1997), in which output prices are flexible while output levels 
are taken as given. Errors in the choice of outputs do not affect the efficiency vector, while errors in 
setting output prices do. The estimated efficiency levels in this case measure how close a bank is to 
its maximum profit given an input–output quantity mix. The price to be paid for this gain is the 
assumption that profits are maximized conditional on output levels, which is a very demanding 
hypothesis. 
The profit function can be interpreted as the result of maximizing profit subject to the constraint 
of reasonable production technology. The profit function is expressed as follows (see Berger and 
Mester 1997). 
Π = Φ(Pn, Wm, Yn, Xn) (5) 
where   is the profit, Yn (  = 1, 2,…,  ) is a vector of output, Pn is the vector of output prices, and 
Wm is a vector of input prices. Xm is a vector of input use, which is a function of prices only. As with 
the cost function, the profit function should satisfy many properties, which are generalizations of cost 
properties. The profit function is estimated from a system of equations. Our extension is on the basis 
of three outputs and three inputs of banks; the translog profit frontier is specified as follows: 
ln πit = β0 + Σn βYn lnYn + Σm βwm lnPm + [Σn Σm βmn lnYn lnXm + Σn Σm βmn lnPm lnPn]/2 + 
Σn Σm βnmw lnYn Pm + ηit + μit 
(6) 
where πit is the profits of bank   in year   to measure the effectiveness of banks in creating a surplus. 
In this study, we will use return on assets (ROA) to measure the effectiveness of management in 
the use of available resources and the extent of their ability to achieve returns, and thus reflects the 
effect of operating, financing, investment, and technological activities. ROA is a useful measure of 
the performance of banks (Molyneux et al. 1996; Polius and Samuel 2000): 
Yn is the vector of the outputs of bank   in year  , which are (i) total loans, (ii) investment and (iii) 
other earning assets; 
Xmt is the vector of input uses (labor, capital, and financial capital) as a function of input prices and 
output; 
Pm is the price of inputs (PL: price of labor (wage), PK: price of capital, PF: price of financial capital); 
nit is the measure of inefficiency in terms of forfeited profits; 
μit is the error term. 
2.5. Historical Dataset (1993–2010) and Relevant Variables 
Banking became a highly regulated industry after the Great Depression in the 1930s in almost 
every country. Within four decades from the era of control and regulation, the US policy makers 
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sought to reduce the regulations by undertaking a series of deregulation measures of the US banking 
system in the 1970s. Gradually, most nations have emulated the US policy in deregulating their 
banking industries. During the era of regulations, the banking industry enjoyed a remarkable 
stability. The rationale for regulation of the first era was driven by the collective wisdom that 
competition will create costly instability in the banking sector. Gradually, policy makers started 
highlighting the massive costs of (banking) regulations, mainly from inefficiencies due to financial 
repression. A major source of banking inefficiency in the first era was identified as the soft application 
of the competition policy to the banking sector for avoiding excessive competition among banks 
triggering a potentially devastating banking instability (see Vives 2010). During the era of 
deregulation, since the 1970s, the enforcement of the competition policy became much more strict in 
the industry exposing banks to face intense competition from each other. This intense competition 
was meant to reduce costly inefficiencies in the banking industry. However, the era of deregulation 
experienced recurring incidents of banking crisis culminating with the subprime crisis of 2007. Thus, 
the controversy over the trade-off between competition and stability has dominated the debate over 
the desirability of competition and efficiency for the banking sector. 
As we highlighted in Footnote 1, during the 1990s, Jordon’s banking system witnessed a series 
of major reforms to promote competition and rivalry in the banking sector, which also led to a 
massive expansion of bank branches with a solid footing in Islamic financial practices. In 2015–2016, 
Reuter’s ranking of leading Islamic finance industries of our globe, Jordon stood at the ninth place. 
Roughly 14% of all banking assets and 11% of all banking equities belong to the Islamic banks while 
the liabilities of Islamic banks are about 25% of banking liabilities in Jordon. Not only Islamic banks 
are a powerful player in Jordon, but its considerable potential for future expansion as financial 
inclusion is still a major problem in Jordon. Hence, in this paper, we will examine the Islamic banks 
of Jordon for the first time to understand the implications of competition for stability for Islamic 
banks. Admittedly, Jordon’s corporate sector will still need to improve the gender-neutrality of the 
corporate culture as highlighted by Banihani and Syed (2020), yet the neutrality of gender for 
productivity is commonly observed in the Islamic banking industry Jordon mainly for dispute 
resolution. Bhatti (2020b) highlighted the importance of effectively managing the procedure of 
Shariat-compliant dispute resolution for achieving social and financial inclusion in Jordon. 
Though there are 14 Islamic banks in Jordan, for newer banks the datasets are inadequate for 
undertaking any long-term analysis. In this paper, we hence use detailed data collected from the 
annual reports of nine (9) major Islamic banks of Jordon or banks with subsidiaries offering banking 
services that are Islamic-sharia complaint. The top three Islamic banks in Jordan had a combined 
balance sheet total of $10.9 billion USD—about 16.3% of total assets of all banks in Jordon. Among 
the top three Islamic banks in Jordan, we are only able to use Jordan Islamic Bank’s (JIB) data for 
offering a reasonably long time-series data. The other two Islamic banks started their operation in 
1997, which will be inadequate for any meaningful time-series analysis. JIB is the leading Islamic 
bank of Jordon. For each of the nine banks, Table 1 provides their identities. We gather data from 
annual and monthly reports for the variables described in Table 2. 
Table 1. List of nine banks chosen for the study. 
1. Arab Bank 2. Arab Egyptian Bank 3. Cairo Amman Bank 
4. Housing Bank 5. Jordan Bank 6. Jordon Commercial Bank 
7. Jordon Islamic Bank 8. Jordan  9. Kuwait Bank 
Source: Constructed by authors. 
Table 2. Choice and labelling of variables. 
Yn: Vector of Output (Y1:Loans, Y2:Investment, Y3:Other Earning Assets) 
Pn: Prices of Output 
Xm: Vector of Inputs (X1: Labour input, X2: Capital Input, X3: Financial Capital Input) 
Pm: Price of Inputs (PL: Price of Labour (Wage) 
PK: Price of Capital, PF: Price of Financial Capital) 
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Cit: Cost of production of bank i at date t 
ITK: IT Budget Allocated to Acquiring only IT Capital (in $) 
Πit: Profit of Bank i at date t 
ηit: Measures inefficiency in terms of profits/costs 
CES: Cost Efficiency Scores 
PES: Profit Efficiency Scores 
Source: Constructed by authors. 
In Table 3, we provide the summary statistics of the chosen variables 
Table 3. Summary statistics of variables of interest. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
CES overall 0.800 0.096 0.600 1.000 N = 162 
 between  0.083 0.726 0.983 n = 9 
 within  0.056 0.659 1.009 T = 18 
PES overall 0.860 0.091 0.540 1.000 N = 162 
 between  0.028 0.825 0.910 n = 9 
 within  0.087 0.539 1.023 T = 18 
ITK(Million) overall 7.307 10.782 0.530 65.118 N = 162 
 between  9.518 2.137 32.335 n = 9 
 within  5.934 -20.170 40.090 T = 18 
Source: constructed by the authors. 
2.6. Implications of Competition for the Banking Industry 
It is an important view of the modern banking literature that there is a trade-off between 
competition and stability in the traditional banking industry. It is often argued that, although 
competition promotes bank efficiency, the competition also contributes to the compromise of the 
systemic stability of the banking industry. This compromise is meant to work through the adverse 
impacts of (increased) competition in banking on bank valuation since increased competition is meant 
to squeeze bank profits. The profit squeeze incentivizes bank executives to indulge in riskier 
investments as they have less to lose. Thus, increased competition can lead to riskier investment by 
banks, which can, in turn, cause increased fragility for the banking industry. From this competition-
fragility perspective, a relatively new view has emerged, at least since the global financial crisis, that 
calls forth a careful balancing of the efficiency benefits with the fragility costs of competition (see 
Jiang et al. 2018). The debate has been immensely popularized by the Economist (The Economist 2009): 
[T]here is clearly some tension between financial stability goals and the tenets of competition 
policy, which hold that oligopolies are inefficient and serve consumers badly … many 
policymakers seem to think that some curbs on competition may be a price worth paying to 
improve stability. 
Senior policymakers from the Federal Reserve of the US accorded significant support to the 
above view that competition breeds banking fragility/instability (see Tarullo 2012). The academic 
economists, however, tend not to fully support the view that the banking system will need less 
competition and efficiency in return for greater stability (see Jiang et al. 2019). The empirical research 
finds that increased competition does not necessarily create banking fragility/instability. Yet, there is 
no convincing argument as to why some banking sectors are robust to increased competition while 
others are not. The important missing link in this context is the use of endogenous sunk-cost 
investment such as information technology (IT) capital, which can have significant impacts on the 
nature of bank competition and thereby on the fragility in the banking sector. 
The existing literature has not examined the role of IT as an endogenous sunk-cost investment 
for the banking industry, especially so or the Islamic banking sector. If IT capital is an endogenous 
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sunk-cost, increased competition will have minimal impacts on the banking industry due to the lower 
bound on the concentration ratio as highlighted by Sutton (2007). Our research can hence offer very 
important insights to explain whether increased competition—as a driver of banking efficiency—
triggers instability, or stability, in the banking sector. 
3. Determinants of Profitability and Endogenous Sunk-Cost Investment of Islamic Banks of 
Jordon: The ARDL Approach 
In Section 3, our goal is to assess if IT capital impacts on the cost and profit efficiency scores of 
the Islamic banks. To do this, we apply the cointegration analysis to explore the short-run and long-
run relationships between IT capital and efficiency scores of Islamic banks. One of the major hurdles 
for analyzing the role of IT capital in our efficiency measures is to address the problems of 
autocorrelation and non-stationarity for making our results reliable. We hence apply the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach of Pesaran et al. (2001). 
The ARDL method is especially suitable for small sample situations (Gangopadhyay and Jain 
2019), as the case in the present study, due to the non-availability of reliable long-run data for 
investments in IT. More importantly, the methodology is capable of handling variables that are 
stationary and non-stationary (integrated of up to order 1 or even fractionally integrated). Results 
obtained from this approach are unbiased and efficient since they are robust to problems of 
autocorrelation. 
The ARDL approach involves two steps. In step 1, as predicted by the theory, we test for the 
existence of the long-run relationship between our variables of interest. If evidence of such a link is 
shown to exist, then in step 2, we estimate the short and long-run parameters of the relationship. 
3.1. Stationarity (Unit Root) Tests 
To check the presence of unit roots in our variables of interests, we have undertaken the 
following tests. (1) the Phillips–Perron (PP) test, (2) the Augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF) test with lag 
length chosen using the modified Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as per Ng and Perron (2001), 
and (3) the procedure suggested by Clemente et al. (1998), allowing for a single structural break 
(additive outlier). The Tables 4 and 5 below present the unit root results from PP test and ADF (AIC). 
Table 4. Unit root statistics for variables of interest. 
Bank Name Variables 
ADF (AIC) PP 
Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference 
Intercept 
Intercept 
& Trend 
Intercept 
Intercept 
& Trend 
Intercept 
Intercept 
& Trend 
Intercept 
Intercept 
& Trend 
Arab Bank 
CES −3.53 ** −3.46 * −3.17 *** −3.03 −3.57 ** −3.54 * −9.94 *** −10.11 *** 
PES −3.42 ** −3.49 * −3.81 ** −3.68 * −2.44 −2.35 −4.53 *** −4.82 *** 
ITK −2.18 0.16 −0.88 −1.64 −4.41 *** −4.91 *** −5.36 *** −5.03 *** 
Arab Egyptian 
Bank 
CES −1.79 −1.63 −3.70 ** −3.61 * −1.86 −1.76 −3.70 ** −3.61 * 
PES −1.65 −5.62 *** −3.99 ** −3.87 ** −3.58 ** −5.64 *** −7.47 *** −7.34 *** 
ITK −3.92 *** −1.27 −9.54 *** −8.53 *** −3.39 ** −5.87 *** −9.54 *** −8.28 *** 
Cairo Amman 
Bank 
CES −1.35 −1.93 3.11 ** −4.65 ** −1.32 −2.25 −4.62 *** −4.91 *** 
PES −3.82 ** −3.46 ** −5.32 *** −5.13 *** −2.77 * −2.80 −5.32 *** −5.13 *** 
ITK −1.58 −2.15 −1.84 −1.91 −2.31 −2.68 −3.75 ** −3.57 * 
Housing Bank 
CES −1.64 −1.90 −1.96 −2.09 −1.43 −0.88 −2.02 −2.09 
PES −2.73 * −3.62 * −5.67 *** −4.06 ** −2.69 * −3.58 * −10.80 *** −12.87 *** 
ITK −0.22 −2.81 −4.56 *** −4.34 ** −1.66 −2.70 −4.28 *** −4.17 ** 
Jordan Bank 
CES −1.55 −2.12 −4.28 *** −6.86 *** −2.19 −2.22 −5.50 *** −5.24 *** 
PES −1.96 −1.86 −4.60 *** −4.77 *** −1.88 −1.89 −4.74 *** −5.19 *** 
ITK −2.62 −4.17 ** −1.60 −1.05 −3.40 ** −8.54 *** −7.01 *** −7.26 *** 
Jordan 
Commercial 
Bank 
CES −2.80 * −3.17 −3.16 ** −3.05 −1.88 −1.83 −3.18 ** −3.08 
PES −4.09 *** −3.98 ** −5.53 *** −5.29 *** −4.19 *** −4.05 ** −11.73 *** −11.62 *** 
ITK −2.11 −0.35 −2.26 −2.81 −4.37 *** −4.15 ** −6.48 *** −6.22 *** 
Jordan Islamic 
Bank 
CES −2.91 * −2.97 −3.56 ** −3.63 * −1.97 −1.97 −2.48 −2.44 
PES −3.57 ** −4.53 ** −5.10 *** −5.09 *** −3.62 ** −4.52 ** −16.58 *** −18.96 *** 
ITK −3.99 *** −1.38 −9.37 *** −8.38 *** −3.46 ** −5.97 *** −9.37 −8.22 
Jordan Kuwait 
Bank 
CES −4.09 *** −4.05 ** −4.67 *** −3.55 * −4.14 *** −4.07 ** −14.14 *** −15.78 *** 
PES −3.45 ** −3.15 −6.35 *** −6.13 *** −3.45 ** −3.35 * −6.35 *** −6.13 *** 
ITK −1.67 −1.83 −2.51 −2.42 −3.18 ** −3.17 −4.73 *** −4.21 ** 
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Union Bank 
CES −4.50 *** −4.43 ** −6.15 *** −6.07 *** −3.38 ** −3.27 −6.19 *** −6.15 *** 
PES −5.09 *** −5.46 *** −6.00 *** −5.75 *** −5.09 *** −5.50 *** −18.74 *** −18.04 *** 
ITK −1.38 −1.67 −2.02 −1.71 −1.91 −2.75 −3.34 ** −3.22 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. Source: constructed by the authors. 
Table 5. Order of integration of variables of interest. 
Banks Variables Order of Integration 
Arab Bank 
CES I(0) 
PES I(1) 
ITK I(1) 
Arab Egyptian Bank 
CES I(1) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(0) 
Cairo Amman Bank 
CES I(1) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(1) 
Housing Bank 
CES I(2) * 
PES I(1) 
ITK I(1) 
Jordan Bank 
CES I(1) 
PES I(1) 
ITK I(1) 
Jordan Commercial Bank 
CES I(1) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(1) 
Jordan Islamic Bank 
CES I(1) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(0) 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
CES I(0) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(1) 
Union Bank 
CES I(0) 
PES I(0) 
ITK I(1) 
Source: constructed by the authors; Note: * The CES figures for Housing Bank are I(2) for some unit 
root tests, hence the ARDL results using CES data are not suitable only for Housing Bank. 
As variables are stationary at the level [I(0)] or First Difference [I(1)], we safely apply the ARDL 
bounds testing approach to detect cointegration. 
3.2. Postulated Models to Unravel the Effects of IT Capital as Sunk-Cost Capital on Efficiency Scores of 
Islamic Banks 
Our postulated model for ARDL bounds testing, at the bank level, is 
∆    =     +       +           +     ∆    
   
     
+     ∆        
   
     
+    (7) 
where y is the dependent variable, which is an efficiency score (say, cost efficiency score (CES)). The 
explanatory variables include the following: lnITK denotes the log values of IT capital of a chosen 
bank. Note that we will undertake the analysis Separately for each of the nine Islamic banks. Note 
that     is a vector of the error term. In Equation (7), the two variables (   and lnITK) are not 
cointegrated if   =   = 0. Pesaran et al. (2001) have proposed the F-test to test the presence of 
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cointegration in the estimated ARDL model. The decision is based on two critical bounds—the upper 
bound and the lower bound. When the value of F-statistic is higher than the upper bound, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, which means a long-run relationship between   and       exist. The ARDL 
model in the above equation assumes a linear combination of dependent and independent variables, 
which indicate a symmetric adjustment in the long and the short-run of y to any shock in our interest 
variable—lnITK. Our model is consistent with Pesaran et al. (2001), who developed a linear 
cointegration autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) to evaluate the long run and the short-
run effects simultaneously. In their model, the dependent variable responds symmetrically to both 
increases and decreases in the independent variable. To do the above, we use the ARDL bounds 
testing approach of Pesaran et al. (2001). 
One of the advantages of using the time series approach is that since coefficient estimates in the 
presence of cointegration have the super consistency property, we do not need to address the 
problem of endogeneity between variables (Engle and Granger 1987). Thus, endogeneity will not 
affect our results. Further, the super consistency property of the estimates holds, even if there are 
omitted stationary variables (Gangopadhyay and Nilekantan 2018; Herzer and Strulik 2017). Step 1 
of the ARDL approach involves estimating an unrestricted ARDL error correction model (ECM), as 
shown in the generic model given by Equation (7). The specific equations and their results are 
summarized in the Tables below. 
4. Findings 
Table 6 shows that there is a long-term relationship between cost efficiency scores and IT capital 
for seven out of nine Islamic banks in Jordon from the historical data set from 1993–2010. This result 
has been anticipated in earlier work on bank profitability and IT capital by Oliner and Sichel (2000) 
for understanding the relevance of information and technology for firm/bank-level efficiency. 
Table 7 confirms that all nine Islamic banks in Jordan, for which the relevant information is 
available out of 14 Islamic banks, the long-term relationship exists between profit efficiency scores 
(PES) and the IT capital. Thus, regardless of choosing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 of this paper, 
there is evidence of IT capital (LnITK) being used as an endogenous sunk-cost investment for Islamic 
banks in Jordon during 1993–2019. 
As highlighted in Section 2.5, during the 1990s, major reforms of the banking sector of Jordon 
led to the (i) liberalization of interest rates and foreign exchange rates, (ii) introduction of new 
financial regulations for enforcing international banking standard, (iii) modernization of Jordan’s 
capital market. These reforms triggered a massive expansion of bank branches intensifying 
competition among banks along with the expansion of the networks of Islamic banks. Several serious 
economic and financial problems engulfed Jordon from rising unemployment, various disasters in 
the Middle East—like the Gulf War, the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis, and social tension from fiscal 
consolidation, massive annual spending of $2.5 billion on refugees despite Jordon’s historical 
dependence on grants and soft loans for financing budget deficits. Yet, as we noted before, the 
banking sector has posted excellent record. Within the banking sector, the Islamic banks consolidated 
their market positions in an increasingly competitive environment, making Jordon the ninth largest 
Islamic finance market of our globe. Islamic banks have more than 25% of the entire banking 
liabilities, or banking debts, of Jordon. The development in the banking sector, especially for the 
Islamic banks, would remain unachievable without meaningful endogenous sunk-cost investments 
by banks, especially the Islamic banks during the new era of competition and rivalry in Jordon’s 
banking sector. These endogenous sunk-cost investments are meaningful, or effective, when they 
improve product quality and foster technological developments without appropriability problems. 
Alternatively, sunk-cost investment could have taken unproductive forms such as “advertisement 
wars” with little consequences for banking efficiencies in Jordon. 
We discovered that Islamic banks during 1993–2010 started using IT capital as a meaningful 
endogenous sunk-cost investment, which not only consolidated their market positionings but also 
created stability in the entire banking industry. 
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Table 6. Estimates of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and error correction model (ECM) models for cost efficiency scores (CES). 
 AB AEB CAB HB JB JCB JIB JKB UB 
Adjustment                    
CESL1 −1.90 ** −1.04 ** 0.91 2.21 −2.40 ** −0.50 −0.79 *** −1.23 *** −1.67 
LONG-RUN 
lnITK −0.02 0.07 −0.39 0.60 ** −0.20 0.06 0.24 *** 0.02 −0.06 
SHORT-RUN 
ΔCESLD 0.84 −0.56 −1.25 −3.84 1.17 * 0.38 − − 0.19 
ΔCESL2D 0.53 −0.20 −1.23 −5.50 − 0.49 − − 0.54 
ΔCESL3D − −0.17 −1.27 −5.46 − −0.60 − − 0.45 
ΔlnITKD1 0.15 0.28 −0.43 2.90 0.90 * −0.22 0.72 *** − 0.33 
ΔlnITKLD −0.06 0.75 −0.51 4.77 0.23 0.31 − − 0.11 
ΔlnITKL2D 0.38 ** 0.36 ** −0.25 4.16 0.14 −0.60 * − − 0.17 
ΔlnITKL3D −0.08 0.07 −0.09 −0.20 0.18 0.17 − − −0.11 
CONSTANT 2.42 ** −0.42 ** −5.95 17.36 2.36 * −0.08 −2.16 ** 0.71 2.86 
Adj R squared 0.73 0.96 0.01 0.64 0.39 0.89 0.80 0.53 0.94 
F statistic for no cointegration 8.52 5.82 0.68 3.83 4.85 11.09 16.42 7.26 6.99 
Cointegration Yes ** Yes ** No No Yes * Yes *** Yes *** Yes ** Yes ** 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. The table provides the estimates of the coefficients of the ARDL regressions. Source: 
constructed by the authors. 
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Table 7. Estimates of ARDL and ECM models for profit efficiency score (PES). 
 AB AEB CAB HB JB JCB JIB JKB UB 
Adjustment                   
PESL1 9.681 −1.067 −1.577 *** −2.929 ** 2.143 −1.09 *** −2.127 *** −2.493 *** −1.425 *** 
LONG-RUN 
lnITK 0.442 *** 0.288 0.0153 −0.02 0.381 ** 0.095 0.009 0.035 * 0.262 ** 
SHORT-RUN 
ΔPESLD −10.389 −0.699 0.448 1.175 * −2.271 − 0.412 1.607 ** − 
ΔPESL2D −6.806 −0.746 0.554 0.802 −1.717 − − 1.319 ** − 
ΔPESL3D 4.927 ** −0.308 0.519 * − −0.525 − − 0.634 ** − 
ΔlnITKD1 35.84 * −1.214 ** − −0.853 * 1.299 − − 0.276 ** −0.998 ** 
ΔlnITKLD 5.549 −0.642 − − −1.312 − − −0.124 −0.423 
ΔlnITKL2D −0.623 0.505 − − 2.236 − − 0.419 *** −0.791 ** 
ΔlnITKL3D −4.516 * 0.295 * − − −0.479 * − − − − 
CONSTANT 62.569 * −3.596 0.907 3.479 * 10.76 −0.578 1.395 0.931 −4.183 ** 
Adj R squared 0.886 0.954 0.575 0.582 0.741 0.442 0.751 0.912 0.798 
F statistic for no cointegration 31.576 21.512 7.694 5.791 7.72 5.349 9.469 27.303 20.569 
Cointegration Yes *** Yes *** Yes ** Yes ** Yes ** Yes * Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. The table provides the esimates of the coefficients of the ardl regressions. Source: 
Constructed by the authors. 
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It is imperative to stress that not all banks can, or should, utilize IT capital as endogenous sunk-
cost investment; if we choose Hypothesis 1, using cost efficiency scores, to test the efficiency of 
endogenous sunk-cost investment, only two out of nine Islamic banks are effective improving their 
relative positions in cost efficiency and thereby able to deter entry by potential competitors (namely, 
JIB and HB, see Table 5, for the variable lnITK) using IT capital. From the existing literature, we know 
only a few firms can effectively use endogenous sunk-cost investment (see Sutton 2007) to create a 
well-functioning market. If we choose Hypothesis 2, using profit efficiency scores (PES), the picture 
becomes clearer: four out of nine Islamic banks can effectively use IT capital as an endogenous sunk-
cost investment to drive efficiency in the sector. 
There are two important messages emerging from the empirical findings. First, an intensification 
of the competitive environment facing a bank, ceteris paribus, will incentivize some banks—if not all 
of them—to increase IT capital to forestall future entry to retain a lower bound on concentration or 
degree of competition in the Islamic banking industry of Jordon. There is inherent stability in the 
Islamic banking industry, and hence, the Islamic banking sector does not face extreme fragility. The 
fragility does not arise as many Islamic banks use the IT capital as an endogenous sunk-cost 
investment to retain the market concentration. 
In their recent work, Jiang et al. (2016), (2018), (2019) also noted that increased competition does 
not necessarily lead to banking fragility in the US context. Our findings lend support to their work 
and also provide an explanation, i.e., the role of endogenous sunk-cost investment in promoting 
efficiency, why more intense competition does not necessarily cause fragility in the (Islamic) banking 
industry. 
The second message is that some Islamic banks suffer in terms of loss of either cost or profit 
efficiencies despite using IT capital to influence the degree of competition in the Islamic banking 
industry. In other words, some banks fail to appropriate the benefits from investing in the sunk-cost 
capital like IT capital. Following the intuition of Sutton (2007), in our future work, we will apply the 
notion of “firms’ capabilities” to explain why some banks can improve their relative efficiency from 
the endogenous sunk-cost investment while others fail. Sutton (2007) forcefully argued the need for 
introducing firms’ capabilities to represent their productivity and product quality in their markets of 
operations. As Sutton argues, “the term capability relates to the set of shared know-how embodied 
in a set of individuals within the firm, from which these levels of productivity and quality derive” (p. 
2308). 
5. Conclusions 
The theory of endogenous sunk-cost investment has become a powerful rationale for explaining 
the persistence of market concentration in many industries, including the banking sector. Industries 
with significant endogenous sunk costs, with expanding markets, will incentivize (some or all) firms 
to increase their investments in these sunk costs, which will in turn limit potential competition by 
preventing entry. In other words, individual banks can use endogenous sunk costs to secure future 
profits by controlling or preventing entry, even though these investments might not directly yield 
any additional profits when other firms/banks invest in endogenous sunk costs. As a result, these 
industries will tend to remain or become more concentrated. 
In this work, we consider the relevance of endogenous sunk-cost investment by Islamic banks, 
to the best of our understanding, for the first time. We find evidence from a historical dataset that 
some Islamic banks in Jordan during 1993–2010 sued information technology investment as an 
endogenous sunk-cost investment. The implications of the finding are far-reaching. It has been a time-
honored debate on whether competition is good for banking; the banking and fragility perspective 
highlights that there is a trade-off between competition and stability in the banking industry. As 
competition boosts efficiency, it significantly compromises banking system stability by squeezing 
profits, lowering bank valuations, and encouraging bankers to make riskier investments because they 
have less to lose (see Jiang et al. 2016, 2018, 2019; Tarullo 2012). As a result, both theoretical and 
empirical research seeks to identify the degree of competition that can suitably balance the efficiency 
benefits and the fragility costs of increased competition. 
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A missing link in the existing research is how endogenous sunk-cost investment can influence 
the competition-fragility perspective for Islamic banks or banks at large since such endogenous 
investments create a lower bound below in which the concentration or degree of competition does 
not fall. This lower bound can offer protection to Islamic banks from becoming too fragile. In other 
words, from our empirical study from Jordan, we find evidence that the Islamic banking industry 
seems to enjoy an inherent protection mechanism that prevents the system from becoming fragile. 
Further work is warranted to fully understand the relevance of the competition-fragility perspective 
for Islamic banks. 
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Appendix A 
In the classical linear regression models, normality is one of the most common assumptions. We 
tested normality of our data using the Jarque and Bera (1980) test. It is one of the most popular tests 
to verify the normality of the regression residuals, which is widely accepted by econometricians 
(Thadewald and Büning 2007). 
The results of the Jarque and Bera (1980) test are present in Table A1. 
Table A1. Diagnostic for normality using the Jarque-Bera test. 
Bank Name 
Jarque–Bera Test 
Normality 
CES PES lnITK 
AB 12.82 *** 2.52 6.38 *** 
AEB 1.57 1.79 7.38 *** 
CAB 1.63 3.47 0.03 
HB 4.39 1.75 0.45 
JB 9.80 *** 4.27 3.92 
JCB 2.24 7.35 *** 11.41 *** 
JIB 0.71 0.45 7.50 *** 
JKB 1.49 0.45 4.51 
UB 1.49 0.31 0.12 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. Source: constructed by the authors. 
The results of the Jarque and Bera (1980) test indicate that CES of Arab Bank (AB) and Jordan 
Bank (JB) are not normally distributed. While the variable PES is not normally distributed for Jordan 
Commercial Bank (JCB). The variable lnITK was found to lack normality for (i) Arab Bank (AB), (ii) 
Arab Egyptian Bank (AEB), (iii) Jordan Commercial Bank (JCB), and iv) Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB). 
To test our models for serial autocorrelation, we undertook the Breusch–Godfrey LM test, with 
the null hypothesis:    = no autocorrelation on the residuals. The results of the test are present in 
Table A2. 
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Table A2. Diagnostic for serial autocorrelation using the Breusch–Godfrey LM test. 
Bank Name 
Breusch–Godfrey 
Serial Correlation 
CES & lnITK PES & lnITK 
AB 0.08 3.43 * 
AEB 7.85 *** 0.29 
CAB 3.28 * 0.1 * 
HB 13.00 *** 0 
JB 3.07 * 2.07 
JCB 6.67 *** 0.06 
JIB 6.88 *** 0.09 
JKB 0.04 0.18 
UB 0.511 2.04 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. Source: constructed by 
the authors. 
The null hypothesis of no-autocorrelations requires to be rejected if the significance level of the 
test statistics exceeds the 5% level of significance. The p-values of the tests indicate that there exists 
no sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for our model contemplating 
the relationship between the variables PES and lnITK. However, our model, which assessed 
cointegration between CES and lnITK of Islamic banks in Jordan, suffered from the problem of serial 
autocorrelation for four banks, namely, the (i) Arab Egyptian Bank, (ii) Houing Bank, (iii) Jordan 
Commercial Bank, and (iv) Jordan Islamic Bank. 
We further undertook the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test, which verifies the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity. The results of the test are present in Table A3. 
Table A3. Test for Heteroskedasticity using Breusch-Pagan test. 
Bank Name 
Breusch–Pagan 
Heteroskedasticity 
CES & lnITK PES & lnITK 
AB 0.64 0.07 
AEB 0.001 0.08 
CAB 2.17 1.21 
HB 1.63 0.01 
JB 1.78 0.72 
JCB 0.16 1.1 
JIB 0.43 0.63 
JKB 1.04 0.03 
UB 1.93 0.01 
Note: *, **, *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. Source: Constructed by the authors. 
The results from the Breusch–Pagan test indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity. Hence, these are models are free from the problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Cumulative Sum Control Charts (CUSUMs) are control charts that display the cumulative sums 
of deviation from a target variable. We used the CUSUM charts to assess if our models are within 
tolerances, or beyond tolerances. The results for our sample banks and their respective models are 
present below. 
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Table A4. Model stability using the Cumulative Sum Control Chart (CUSUM) test. 
Bank CES PES 
AB 
 
AEB 
 
CAB 
 
HB 
 
JB 
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JCB 
 
JIB 
 
JKB 
 
UB 
 
The results of the CUSUM test indicate that our model assessing the cointegration of CES and 
lnITK for (i) Jordan Bank and (ii) Jordan Islamic Bank, which have problems of parameter stability. 
While, the model testing cointegration between PES and lnITK, suffer from the problem of parameter 
stability in the case of (i) Cairo Amman Bank. 
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